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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

assignment, mortgage, pledge, levy and sale, partition, or agreement to treat the interest as belonging to the tenants as tenants
in common. 48 C.J.S. 927 (1947). The principal case adds one
more method, i.e., murder. The court in In re King's Estate, supra,
expressly refused to add murder as an "approved" method by which
a joint tenancy may be converted into a tenancy in common.
These cases reveal a tendency on the part of the courts to
favor the maxim precluding benefit from one's own wrong over the
right to inherit property. The courts do not agree upon the rationale or the proper method for resolving the conflict, but they do
agree that the murderer should not benefit from his wrongful act.
W.A.K.
PUBLIc UTILrms-INJUNCrION

AcAIs

GoviuRNmNr

AciN-

cixs.-Plaintiffs, a group of privately owned electric power utilities,
sought to enjoin the Rural Electrification Administration (REA)
and the Southwestern Power Administration (SPA), federal agencies
within the Departments of Agriculture and Interior respectively,
from entering into certain contracts with private federated power
cooperatives. By these contracts, REA, which is empowered to
lend money for "the purpose of furnishing electric energy to persons not receiving central station service" would lend money to
the cooperatives for the construction of generation, transmission,
and related facilities. Plaintiffs were then furnishing the cooperatives with central station service. Under a provision of the contract
with REA, the cooperatives were to enter into a separate contract
with SPA to sell all the power produced at the new generating
plant to SPA and to construct and lease transmission lines to SPA.
SPA in turn, was to supply the cooperatives with all their power
requirements, which the plaintiffs were then doing. The cooperatives could buy power from any other source in case SPA was unable to furnish all their requirements. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
on the grounds that the contracts violated the loan standards of the
REA and enabled the cooperatives to engage in ruinous competition
with the plaintiffs. Held, on appeal, that the competition which
the plaintiffs would suffer as a result of these contracts was not a
sufficient interest to enable the plaintiffs to sue. Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
In the instant case the court applied the rationale laid down
in Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), and Alabama
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Power Co. v. Ickes, 802 U.S. 464 (1988). The Tennessee Power
Company case, supra, held that the right invaded had to be a legal
right before the validity of action taken under a statute could be
contested. The Alabama Power Company case, supra, held that
injury to the plaintiff utility companies was damnum absque injuria
when it resulted from certain municipalities which were enabled to
compete ruinously with the plaintiffs after receiving federal loans.
However, notwithstanding the tenor of finality of those decisions
and with all deference to the court in the instant case, the application of the rule in the present case would appear to create an
extremely anomalous situation.
It is beyond argument that public service commissions, through
the issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity, regulate
and control public utility corporations, both as to their individual
activities and as to competition among them in the same consumer
areas. Further, where a public utility company has been rendering
adequate service in a particular consumer area, commissions have
generally refused to issue certificates of convenience to rival utilities
of the same kind seeking to operate in the same area. The theory
for refusing to issue certificates to the new utility in such situations
is that through avoiding duplication of facilities and efforts, costly
price wars, and demanding satisfactory service while allowing a
"fair return", the public interests are better served. Thus, we have
the theory and practice of regulated monopoly, certainly not of
recent origin, having been thoroughly recognized and analyzed quite
a few years ago. See Hardman, The Changing Law of Competition
in Public Service, 83 W. VA. L.Q. 219 (1927).
And even among corporations which are not public utilities,
where competition is deemed to better serva the public interest
and is "the life of trade", competition in restraint of trade is not
permitted by the federal government under the Clayton Act. 38
In the instant case,
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 14 (1951).
at least in substance if not in form, the "power" and "lease" contracts would appear to be perfect examples of the type of "tying
clauses" which have been held to be invalid as being in "restraint of
trade." See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 300
(1949).
In addition, it is submitted that the provision of the cooperatives' contract with SPA, allowing the cooperatives to purchase
power from other producers if SPA is unable to meet their require-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss4/16

2

McG.: Public Utilities--Injunction Against Government Agencies

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

ments, means little or nothing. First, because the cooperative is
the type of customer to which SPA is restricted in section 5 of the
Flood Control Act of 1944, 61 STAT. 501 (1947), 16 U.S.C.A. § 825s
(1952), SPA is not likely to ignore the needs of their "preferred
customer." Secondly, the cooperatives themselves are not likely to
let such a situation develop since they can purchase power from
SPA at substantially lower rates than they would have to pay a
private producer charged with meeting bonded indebtedness, taxes,
and showing a profit to stockholders.
So, the situation would appear to be completely befuddled. In
a field of corporate enterprise where competition is the exception
rather than the rule, competition has been allowed. And the competition itself appears to be at least questionable under the rules
laid down by the sovereign participating in it. Truly, the king can
do no wrong.
A very recent case at the state level, involving substantially
the same facts as the instant case, has been decided squarely against
a rural cooperative. ArkansasElectric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas
Missouri Power Co., 221 Ark. 688, 255 S.W.2d 674 (1953). In that
case the cooperative was prevented from selling power to SPA
under a state statute regulating the activities of such cooperatives.
In addition the contemplated contract between the cooperative
and SPA was also held to be invalid on the federal grounds that
Congress had not authorized SPA to acquire power in this manner.
This determination of the federal law is clearly unnecessary and is
probably dictum. But even so, the case does show a possible method
of attack on the part of utilities where these cooperatives are considered subject to state commission regulation. This jurisdictional
conflict, according to one commentator, is one which the REA, while
contending that the cooperatives are not subject to state commission regulation, has tried to avoid having determined in the United
States Supreme Court. See TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTnxEs
513 (1947). The reason that author gives for such reluctance on
the part of REA is that a Supreme Court test of jurisdiction would
necessarily involve a determination of the question of whether a
federal agency has the right to control the intrastate business of
private corporations.
C. S. McG.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1956

3

